Security

This section is intended to provide UTSA with guidelines and recommendations to enhance an already excellent security program. These recommendations are in concert with the philosophy of the university to provide a open, inviting and enriching environment for the students, visitors, faculty and staff of UTSA. The recommendations are also compliant with the University of Texas System Office of Facilities Planning and Construction (OFPC) Security Planning and Design Guidelines.

In documenting the security goals and objectives of UTSA, the team endeavored to provide recommendations that will enhance and/or build upon the current programs in place. Activities associated with this engagement included:

• Interviews with senior administration, university faculty and staff, representatives from the local student government, and UTSA Police Department personnel
• Surveys of the campus observing current conditions, security systems and device applications relative to site and exterior applications, and critical architectural elements of the campus
• Detailed review of current campus plans
• Research into past and current events and security issues at the UTSA campus analyzing campus and local crime statistics
• Application of experience and knowledge of similar environments to extrapolate future security needs as a result of projected growth

The information obtained through these activities was applied to a security model that is derived from the interrelationships of the core security elements as illustrated in Figure 19. These security elements represent the holistic and natural synergistic strength of architectural preventative measures, technical security systems and operational preventative measures. As with any holistic program, no one element can stand alone. It is only where convergence occurs that the desired result is achieved.

The balanced application of these components along with adherence to the concepts of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED), yield a robust, adaptable and yet non-invasive security program.

Architectural preventative measures include locks, physical barriers such as doors, gates or bollards, lighting and landscaping. Technical security systems include electronic access control systems, intrusion detection systems, video monitoring and control systems and security communications systems. Operational preventative measures include public safety staff, public safety and/or campus policies and procedures and crime prevention programs.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design embraces a philosophy of utilizing natural and planned resources in conjunction with the traditional security elements to reduce vulnerability to crime.

Design Concepts

The concepts and strategies discussed here will follow the recognized security principles identified in section one including Crime Prevention through Environmental Design and additionally, Concentric Circles of Protection.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a concept that attempts to utilize planned resources such as architectural barriers, landscaping, and lighting in conjunction with traditional security elements to reduce vulnerability. The concept of CPTED is based on the premise that the physical environment can be planned to produce behavioral effects that will reduce the likelihood of security-related incidents by "designing-out" vulnerabilities.

Concentric Circles of Protection (CCP) is a concept that is based on the requirement for varying levels of protection starting at the site perimeter, working through the building perimeter and interior specialty controlled areas, becoming increasingly more stringent as one proceeds through each level to reach the most sensitive areas. In order to provide an opportunity for response, evaluation, and control of intruders or unauthorized individuals, "Intervention Zones" are introduced into the concept. Examples of intervention zones may include personnel posted at vehicular entrances and loading docks or the use of electronic systems such as access control systems.

Electronic security systems are currently in place on the UTSA campus. The acceptance of these systems by the university population allows the application of proven security design principles to produce a fully integrated security program that will capitalize on the synergistic strength of the three basic security elements. These elements as illustrated in section one diagrams the holistic effect resulting from the balanced application of architectural, electronic and operational preventative measures. As with any holistic program, no single element can stand alone. It is only with the convergence of all three elements that provides the desired result. Examples of each component can be found below.

Campus security solutions must be a balance of architectural, electronic and operational measures. Passive solutions should be integrated with current technology to derive the most effective security solution, cognizant of cost and operational requirements. Physical design can create a sphere of influence so that users develop a sense of ownership that potential offenders perceive as a territorial influence. At the same time, natural access control and surveillance will promote more responsiveness by users in protecting their territory and promote a greater perception of risk by offenders. The overall security program must present sufficient obstacles to deter perpetrators at all levels. It is important, however, to differentiate between deterrence and elimination. No security measures, regardless of how involved or sophisticated they may be, can ensure protection against any possible threat. It is the sole intent of any security program to provide such obstacles and observation methods that the risks of exposure, failure, or capture are greater than the potential for success in perpetrating the incident.

Design Guidelines

This section will focus on the recommended design guidelines for the UTSA Campus. The guidelines generally follow the Concentric Circles of Protection concept, beginning at the property boundary and moving inward.

Architectural

Site Planning: Transportation and Parking

• Campus Accessibility: Vehicular and Pedestrian
• The campus is an open environment which welcomes students, staff, faculty, and guests. As an academic institution, this openness is critical in order to encourage community participation in the campus lifestyle. Construction of additional athletic and special event facilities will attract people from the community to visit the campus. Currently, the majority of people arriving on campus are in private vehicles. Combined with the projected increase in student population, vehicular traffic on campus will undergo a dramatic increase in the coming years. The master plan calls for several roadway improvements including a new major north-south connector between Loop 1604 and UTSA Boulevard and improvements to the existing two major campus entrances.
• Direct roadway access to the university buildings, excepting service drives, should be minimized. Indirect access decreases the potential for a vehicle to crash into the buildings, whether intentionally or accidentally. Adjacent hardscape should also provide deterrents and impediments to vehicle access to building exteriors such as fixed bollards, concrete planters, decorative concrete fixtures, or elevation changes. Major roadways should lead to minor roadways which should lead to parking areas. Where drop-off areas adjacent to buildings are necessary, they should be set back from the building face.
• To provide effective monitoring and management of the traffic in and around the campus, traffic surveillance cameras should be placed to view all major roadways and intersections. Cameras should be located on adjacent buildings at the roof level where available or on nearby light poles as required to provide the desired views. Providing this level of monitoring will enable the UTSA Police Department to monitor traffic conditions from the Dispatch and Control Center (DCC) and to dispatch officers to situations as needed. This should reduce the requirement for officers to personally monitor the roadway intersections. UTSA should investigate partnering with TXDOT and/or the San Antonio Department of Public Works to share traffic monitoring cameras in place around the campus.
• Pedestrian access to the campus will also undergo significant changes as the master plan is implemented. As the pedestrian traffic increases, a proportional increase in pedestrian walkways and other accommodations will be provided. Pedestrian pathways should be open, providing a clear view for an extended distance. Landscaping should be planned to provide unobstructed views both initially and when the landscaping matures. Shrubs should be kept to below 18 inches in height, and trees should be trimmed up to a minimum of 72 inches above grade to provide a clear line of sight underneath the trees' foliage. Trees should also be spaced sufficiently to allow the site lighting to illuminate the pathway. The current practice of providing emergency assistance stations should continue along the paseos and major pedestrian paths. Expansion of the emergency assistance station system should be uniform and consistent across the campus. Emergency assistance stations should be located near all mass transit stops and pedestrian entrance areas (within the campus property) and should also include video surveillance of these areas. Spacing of the emergency assistance stations should be within 100 feet of the site entry and no more than every 500 feet apart along the paseos.

• Service Yards and Drives
• The service drives and loading docks under the buildings offer an effective means to provide the necessary services and support to the campus without conflicting with pedestrians arriving and leaving these same buildings on the paseo level. However, the service drives, if unsecured, represent a significant vulnerability to the university under the current threat scenario. The ability to restrict and control vehicular access underneath the buildings is paramount to achieving any meaningful measure of protection. Closing these drives except to UTSA vehicles is impractical given the cost to retrofit the buildings with surface-accessible service areas. Alternately, the service drives should be strictly controlled and permission to use these drives should be granted to only those persons and companies that have undergone sufficient vetting. The drives should be equipped with retractable, crash resistant vehicle barriers operated by the campus access control system, with an override control from the DCC and video surveillance cameras. Access to unknown individuals or companies should be denied until such time as the individual or company is vetted.

• Surface Parking
• Surface parking lots should be located as close as possible to the intended user group. Parking lots should be open and should provide a clear field of view. Trees within parking lots should be trimmed to allow clear lines of sight. Signage should be provided which clearly indicates any usage restrictions. Signage should also provide wayfinding assistance to the intended building or activity area.

• Parking Structures
• Parking structures typically present a different set of requirements for security based on the design of the structures and the density of the vehicles. In order to provide an effective measure of protection for garage patrons, stairwells and elevator lobbies should be open to the exterior, providing unobstructed sight from the surrounding grade level areas. Open stairwells and elevator lobbies reduce the likelihood of criminal activity and vagrants sleeping in the stairwells. Pedestrian entries should be located adjacent to and viewable from the paseos or other activity areas if at all possible. Entrances and exits should not be located along dark roadways or unpopulated areas.

Setback Distances and Clear Zones

In order to achieve blast mitigation benefits, new buildings should be designed with a setback from the closest vehicle approach. A 100-foot setback is preferred, but existing buildings should be reviewed on a case by case basis to determine the risk of having vehicles in close proximity to the structure. Where achieving the setback is impractical or impossible, alternate means of achieving the desired level of mitigation should be explored. Critical functions should be moved to a safer location within the building or to another, more easily secured building.

Perimeter Building Control

The UTSA Police Department currently employs access control devices on the building perimeter entrances. All new projects are designed with these devices in place to control after-hours access to the buildings. This practice should be continued and should also be expanded to include all existing buildings on campus as capital funds become available.

As a general rule, every major building entrance should be equipped with access control devices for 24x7 building or after-hours control depending on the function of the building. Secondary entrances and emergency exits should be equipped with monitoring devices to alert the police department of unauthorized entry attempts or improper exiting from the building.

Special function buildings or research facilities will require an enhanced application of access control devices based on their specific function.

Physical Barriers - Gates | Bollards | Landscaping

• Gates | Bollards
• The service drives underneath the academic buildings should be controlled with operable barriers. The operable barriers may be barrier gates or operable bollard arrays. Operable bollard arrays are preferable in order to prevent unauthorized vehicles from accessing the service drives and driving underneath the buildings. In addition to the bollard arrays, additional barrier devices such as fixed bollards will be required to provide a continuous barrier from structure to structure. The fixed bollards could be steel posts set in concrete, decorative planters of sufficient mass to repel a vehicle, or monumental concrete fixtures.

• Landscaping

From a security perspective, landscaping can serve two opposing and yet similar functions. First, environmental amenity landscaping can provide areas of concealment or block security lighting, conflicting with the security program. Second, landscaping can serve to enhance the security program as well as serve as perform its function as an environmental amenity.

The landscaping design should adhere to the following guidelines:

• Landscape elements should provide no areas of concealment in or around building entrances, pedestrian walkways, or parking lot perimeters.
• Shrubs and similar ground cover should be limited to a maximum of 18 inches in height around building entrances, pedestrian walkways, or parking lot perimeters.
• Trees should be trimmed up to a minimum of 72 inches above grade to provide a clear view underneath the foliage.
• Trees and other tall plants should be spaced sufficiently to allow both natural light and artificial light to penetrate the foliage achieving the recommended lighting levels.
• Screening function landscaping should be avoided in the vicinity of building entrances, pedestrian walkways or parking lot perimeters.

Where a natural barrier is desired to enhance the security around a building or other area, the following guidelines should be followed:

• Landscaping schemes may be used to define traffic patterns and security zones, while providing maximum visibility across the site.
• Landscaping design should offer a substantial deterrent effect against vehicular penetration.
• Landscaping must not provide convenient places to hide and should allow for unobstructed surveillance from the building outward.
• Planting and maintenance of trees within parking lots should be done in ways which maintain clear lines of sight.
• A clear area around each building of at least five feet is advisable to discourage access while facilitating easy surveillance by the security department.

Signage

External signage should be used to direct students, delivery vehicles, visitors, and staff to the proper parking area or building access point. Due to the eventual large size of the campus, this will be a critical component in preventing accidental misuse of parking areas and entrances into the campus.

Space Requirements

The UTSA Police Department's Dispatch and Control Center (DCC) needs to be relocated and expanded. The current size of the DCC is inadequate to effectively deal with the planned growth of the campus. In addition, the layout of the DCC is terribly inefficient due to the space constraints and phased implementation of the various systems within the DCC. The DCC should be designed to support the functionality of the personnel including their dispatch functions.

In order to provide an effective 24/7 dispatch and security monitoring and response operation, the following criteria should be used as guidelines in the development of a replacement DCC:

• The DCC should be divided into separate functional elements, one providing the dispatch and emergence response function and the other providing the security monitoring and control functions. The two functions benefit from being co-located, but the requirements of each functional element are more than one person can handle. The planned growth within the next five years alone will far exceed the capabilities of the current design.
• The sensitive operations of the DCC should be physically protected in order to prevent accidental or intentional damage. As such, the DCC should not be placed along a building perimeter wall, and should be somewhat protected from public areas. This should be balanced with a central location so that the other police department functions can be maintained.
• The DCC will require a main monitoring and control room and an adjacent equipment room. The console room will accommodate the dispatch, monitoring and control elements of the systems, and the equipment room will contain those system components that do not need to be accessed regularly.
• Space should be provided as follows:
  • Dispatch Control Center: 900 square feet
  • Security Equipment Room: 400 square feet
  • Storage room: 50 square feet
  • Fire Command Center: 100 square feet
  • Key Control and Management: 50 square feet
• The DCC should utilize modular consoles designed specifically for the aesthetic and ergonomic mounting of the security systems control and monitoring equipment.
• Additional DCC architectural considerations include:
  • 120 VAC emergency power is needed to support the security equipment.
  • HVAC systems should be self-supporting and should provide varying control of the temperature to accommodate comfort levels for control room staff. The equipment room should maintain a constant temperature to support the electronic equipment.
  • Lighting within the console room should be indirect lighting. Rheostat variable lighting control is suggested. Work surfaces within the console room should be equipped with task lighting. Standard fixed building lighting is sufficient to support the adjacent equipment room.
  • A non-conductive fire suppression system should be used for the console and equipment rooms. Where this is not possible, a dry pipe pre-action sprinkler system can be considered. In either case, the fire alarm system installed within the console and equipment rooms should be individually zoned.
  • Raised flooring reinforced to support the concentrated loads of security equipment.
  • Multiple PABX lines should be provided to allow communications internally. An off-PBX outside line will be required for hot-line usage or auxiliary communications to the outside when the PBX is disabled.

MEP Systems

Exterior Lighting

Adequate lighting is desirable throughout the site, within the parking garages, in public areas, at the exterior of the buildings and in public corridors, and along walkways. The appropriate use of lighting will enhance security and will help foster a safe and secure environment. Appropriate lighting is important for many reasons including deterring criminal activity; discouraging unwanted visitors; assisting security personnel in their ability to view, identify and respond to security situations; and promoting a sense of safety and security in tenants and visitors. Metal halide lighting is recommended as it provides neutral color balance.

Lighting plays an important role in deterring crime and maintaining a safe environment in and around the campus buildings. The importance of lighting cannot be overemphasized.

There are three different considerations that apply to site lighting:

• Closed Circuit Television - Lighting required for optimal performance of standard color CCTV cameras is in the one-foot candle range.
• Safety - Lighting for safety purposes as defined by the Illuminating Engineers Society of North America (IESNA) take into account only the levels needed to prevent accidents and to accommodate normal facility use.
• Security - There are no current standards for protective or security lighting.

The following light levels are a compilation of IESNA recommendations which are appropriate, given the nature of the site. The lighting levels should be considered to represent baseline requirements for security purposes. Minimum luminance values are as follows:



*Lighting levels at the exterior of building entrances should maintain the same illumination level as the interior lobby in order to avoid light reflection from the inside. If the exterior is darker than the inside, reflection will occur on the interior of the glass.

 

 

HVAC Fresh Air Intakes

It is recommended that the air intakes for all buildings be located on the roof or above 30 feet above grade in order to reduce contamination vulnerability. If outside air enters the system from the roof, it is relatively well protected from intentional external contamination. The use of intake cover grilles will further reduce the chance of foreign objects contaminating the system.

Access Control System Application Guidelines

UTSA currently employs access control devices on new building perimeter entrances and a limited number of existing buildings. All new projects are designed with these devices in place to control after-hours access to the buildings. This practice should be continued and should also be expanded to include all existing buildings on campus as capital funds become available.

As a general rule, every major building entrance should be equipped with access control devices for 24x7 building or after-hours control depending on the function of the building. Secondary entrances and emergency exits should be equipped with monitoring devices to alert the police department of unauthorized entry attempts or improper exiting from the building.

Access control should be considered for all new parking structure vehicle entrances where access to the structure needs to be restricted on a continuous basis or during certain hours of operation.

Special function buildings or research facilities will require an enhanced application of access control devices based on their specific function.

Infrastructure Provisions

• Security Closets

In general, security systems utilize a distributed electronics approach. This implies that data gathering and power transformer panels are located in the field to support the field devices. This field equipment typically resides within dedicated security closets, but may be shared with any low voltage trade such as telephone, data, or fire.

• Conduit

Because the majority of security system field devices are low voltage (12-24V), point-to-point conduit is not required. As such, security conduit should be limited to vertical conduit runs at field devices and riser areas. In general, horizontal cable required to support the security systems should be plenum rated and routed though accessible ceiling or under floor spaces, exposed (not in conduit). Cable tray systems may be utilized where space is specified by the electrical engineer for low voltage trades. Otherwise, cable should be routed above the ceiling grid through bridle rings connected to structural elements.

The exceptions to this are security field devices located within exposed structure areas such as docks and parking garages. In these areas, EMT conduit will be required for all security devices.

• Power

Because the security system field devices are primarily low voltage (12-24V), the majority of 120VAC will be transformed and distributed from security closets. However, there will be requirements for additional 120VAC circuits dedicated to security equipment at the following field locations:

• Delayed exit and electrified panic locking mechanisms
• Exterior security devices, i.e. cameras, card reader pedestals, etc.
• Emergency intercom stations